Introduction
In this discussion paper I will address some unresolved issues in regard to the application of state aid law in the field of taxation. From the onset it must be pointed out that there are no rules on 'fiscal' state aid. EU law does provide for rules on state aid, be it subsidies, tax incentives or otherwise. These general rules must be implemented in a tax setting which brings to bear some particular tax related difficulties. This paper will set out some of those.
I have selected a number of issues for further discussion. These issues are bound to become the subject of court proceedings in near future. In paragraph 2 I will address the question whether limitation of tax benefits to groups as such may lead to selectivity. Then in 3 I will go into the position of investment fund regimes under state aid rules. In 4 I will address some matters that will arise now that the ECJ opened up to recognising regional autonomy in state aid cases. In 5 the issue of asymmetric VAT cases will be put in a state aid perspective. The unenviable position of the tax payer that expects his incentive to qualify as state aid will be addressed in 6. Then in 7 I briefly single out one recent US development that may be of interest to put the EU's concept of state aid control into perspective. Some concluding remarks and a summary of issues for further discussion follow in paragraph 8.
For background information on state aid in general and fiscal state aid in particular I refer to the European Commission's 1998 Notice on the application of state aid rules in regard to business taxation. 1 Although there have been numerous developments in regard to details this
Communication still provides a basic overview. at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/vademecum_on_rules_2007_en.pdf.
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2.
Are facilities limited to intra-group activities selective as such?
In order for a tax incentive to meet the definition of state aid (Article 87(1) EC) it must fulfil a number of criteria:
1)
A financial benefit must be present (i.e. the 'incentive').
2) The benefit must be granted by the state or out of state resources; the latter is rather easily settled when tax revenue is at stake. Any benefit must be attributable to the state (i.e. the state should not be under a clear and precise obligation of Community law to grant a tax benefit).
3) The benefit should (threaten to) distort competition and (potentially) affect trade between Member States; this is the 'raison d'être' of state aid control.
4)
The benefit should only be available to certain undertaking (or the production of certain goods, i.e. certain sectors of industry), hence not generally available.
A tax incentive that meets these four criteria is regarded to be 'incompatible with the common market', i.e. prohibited by EU law, unless otherwise provided by the EC Treaty. The latter does allow certain benefits to be granted for a number of purposes like, for instance, promoting the development of less developed regions as provided for in Article 87(3) EC.
Thus, the EC Treaty does not contain an unequivocal prohibition of state aid; it is for this reason that a state aid supervision procedure is in place that allows the Commission to determine whether the criteria for 'compatibility' with the common market are met.
In regard to tax incentives it is the fourth criteria -the presence of 'selectivity' -that gives most cause for concern. In this paragraph I would like to focus on a (potential) new form of selectivity that the Commission is trying to put in place.
Upon opening two recent formal investigations the European Commission has argued that providing tax benefits to enterprises that need to be part of a group of companies may give rise to selectivity. The question whether an intra-group benefit as such results in selectivity has never been answered by the ECJ, although the ECJ did rule on a large number of cases where intra-group incentives were at issue. In cases with intra-group tax benefits, selectivity was considered present based on something other than the group limitation. In most cases - It then pointed out that additional requirements in respect to the kind of financial activities performed and the need for considerable financial resources to qualify also gave rise to selectivity in this case. In the final decision the intra-group factor was no longer addressed as a factor that gave rise to selectivity by itself. were excluded upfront from the application of the regime, which could indeed give rise to state aid issues. Also, the Commission seemed concerned about the possibility to opt-out of the Hungarian regime on a yearly basis. Given that this opt-out is available to every taxpayer, one might wonder what the Commission's intentions were to include this in its press release to argue that selectivity is present.
-5 - It follows from VAT jurisprudence, especially the BBL and EDM cases, that the collective investment of capital raised from the public by means of the assembling and management of portfolios consisting of transferable securities on a fee-basis on behalf of the subscribers may constitute an economic activity. 10 The same is true for receiving interest resulting from the placements of monies received from clients in the course of managing their properties, taking account of the fact that such interest does not arise from the simple ownership of the asset. I.e.
an investment fund may provide services as a managing agent with the commercial purpose of maximising return on investment for its clients. 11 Many (incorporated) funds will carry out economic activities like these. Funds that carry out economic activities as defined in these and other VAT cases may be considered to be 'undertakings' as stated in Article 87(1) EC.
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The expertise brought together in investment funds and the services rendered by these funds Member States might try to argue that reducing the tax burden on funds is necessary because of the particular characteristics of their tax system. They could, for instance, point out the need for transparency in order to prevent taxing investment profits twice, at the level of the fund (being to a certain extent an intermediary as well as a service provider) and at the level of the individual investor.
The question then to be answered is whether reducing the tax burden on funds to reduce double taxation is an acceptable justification resulting from the 'nature or general scheme of the tax system', i.e. the 'logic of the tax system' in which case no (selective) benefit will be deemed present. In my opinion, this But what if an autonomous regional authority would be empowered to set a corporation tax rate for the region that is lower than the rate normally applicable in the Member State? The basic question that has to be answered is to what extent autonomous regional or local authorities are at liberty to set their own tax policy. The ECJ considered:
"It is possible that an infra-State body enjoys a legal and factual status which makes it sufficiently autonomous in relation to the central government of a Member State, with the result that, by the measures it adopts, it is that body and not the central government which plays a fundamental role in the definition of the political and economic environment in which undertakings operate. In such a case it is the area in which the infra-State body responsible for the measure exercises its powers, and not the country as a whole, that constitutes the relevant context for the assessment of whether a measure adopted by such a body favours certain undertakings in comparison with others in a comparable legal and factual situation, having regard to the objective pursued by the measure or the legal system concerned."
20
The main issue to be settled is whether local governments have a sufficient level of autonomy in order to invoke regional autonomy. The ECJ provided for three conditions that have to be fulfilled. First, the sub-national authority concerned must have a separate political and administrative status, i.e. it should be competent to deal with its own (fiscal) affairs and be politically and financially held accountable. Second, a decision with regard to reducing the tax rate for the region concerned, as in the case in question, must have been adopted without the joint cases C-400/97 to C-402/97, Para. ECJ C-88/03, ibid., Para. 58. This case only concerned local tax rates, but a similar line of reasoning may be used in respect of autonomous tax policy, which includes setting the tax base.
-11 -central government being able to directly intervene. Third, the financial consequences of the decision must not be offset by financial aid from other regions or the central government. of revenue out of local income and corporation taxes to the national government to cover defence and foreign policy expenditure? Would a decrease in local tax revenue and the subsequent reduction of the sum transferred also be an 'offset' (in the absence of safeguards to prevent such effect)? These issues still remain to be decided.
In the aforementioned Portuguese case, the position of the Azores was at issue. In the pending
Gibraltar case (T-211/04) the relationship between Gibraltar and the UK is at issue, and in seven nearly identical cases (C-428/06 through C-434/06) it is the position of several autonomous communities in Spain. In these Spanish cases, the question has been referred whether certain local autonomous communities may set a lower rate of tax and introduce special tax deductions next to a tax-base otherwise similar to the normal Spanish tax base. -12 -Without focussing on Spain in particular, provided that regional authorities meet the criteria of autonomy it should not matter whether they are at liberty to use the normal national tax system as a starting point to copy-paste the tax base. VAT liability may be a benefit as well as a burden to enterprises. The role state aid may play in cases of failure to timely implement VAT Directives may be a particular one.
What if national law decrees that an activity is exempt from VAT while the EU's VAT
Directive clearly provides that it shouldn't be? 23 In such a case the deduction of input VAT will normally be refused by the national authorities in accordance with national law, since there is no VAT due on output either. May an enterprise that carries out such activities now rely on the Directive in order to be entitled to a deduction of input VAT? Taking account of the ECJ's jurisprudence one is inclined to give an affirmative answer, although AdvocateGeneral Kokott rightly points out a particular problem in the VDP case: Apart from the potential cases below, the author would like to refer to the Austrian Heiser case in which the ECJ ruled that upon the transition of a subject-to-tax to a tax-exempt status of activities, the national non-application of the Directive provisions on adjustment of initially deducted VAT for a certain sector of industry constituted state aid: "[Article 87 EC] must be interpreted as meaning that a rule […] providing that the changeover for medical practitioners from taxable to exempt status for the purposes of VAT does not, in relation to goods that continue to be used in the business, entail the reduction of -14 -
(1) An activity is deemed subject to VAT under national law, while being exempt under the Directive. A benefit may arise if the deductible input VAT exceeds the output VAT due.
(2) An activity is deemed exempt from VAT under national law, while being subject to VAT under the Directive. A benefit may arise if the taxable person is enabled to deduct the input VAT without being liable to output VAT.
(3) An activity is deemed exempt from VAT under national law, while being subject to VAT under the Directive. A benefit may arise if the non-collected output VAT would have exceeded the non-deductible input VAT.
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Situation (2) may be the outcome of an asymmetrical domestic situation where a national legal basis for tax liability (output VAT) is missing while the deduction of input VAT is claimed in line with the Directive. In this situation it is the national law that gives rise to this benefit. Since the definition of state aid in Article 87(1) EC is an objective one, it is not necessary to proof that the national legislator had the intention of creating this kind of benefit.
A benefit is created out of state resources, applicable only to enterprises carrying out certain 'exempt' activities. Given the fact that the exemption is not warranted by EU secondary legislation, the resulting benefit is still attributable to the state.
27
The question thus to be answered by the ECJ is whether an enterprise may rely on a Directive to benefit from the input VAT deduction whilst the levying of tax on the output VAT is -15 -my opinion, the national courts should follow Advocate-General Kokott's suggestion to prevent this issue from arising.
28
6. How to protect beneficiaries of aid against themselves and their governments?
EC state aid procedure is not flawless, especially when it concerns the protection of beneficiaries. The ECJ has stated that a diligent businessman should normally be able to determine whether proper state aid procedure has been followed. 29 But what to do with the (well advised) businessman who sincerely doubts the state aid compatibility of a tax incentive he is about to claim?
Only the Member State's government is competent to notify a tax incentive to the European
Commission. There is no system in place that allows beneficiaries to get the Commission to affirm whether a tax incentive constitutes state aid or not. The (potential) beneficiary may try its luck at the national government involved, hoping that the government will officially notify the incentive to the Commission. In case of an existing tax incentive the latter is rather unlikely. As a result of notification the stand-still provision of Article 88(3) EC takes effect, which forbids Member States to introduce the notified incentive until a final decision has been taken by the Commission. This would also affect other tax payers that have claimed or are 28
Notwithstanding other potential problems like the fact that output VAT will not have been collected because of the national exemption. Companies are unlikely to proceed in national court if they expect to pay VAT on balance. Given that no output VAT will have been collected in case of a misplaced exemption, the national courts could consider to limit the input VAT deduction to the VAT receivable on balance (input VAT minus non-collected output VAT) in order to uphold the objectives and principles of the VAT Directive. expectation that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted in compliance with the procedure laid down in that article. A diligent businessman should normally be able to determine whether that procedure has been followed […] Community law requires the competent authority to revoke a decision granting unlawful aid, in accordance with a final decision of the Commission declaring the aid incompatible with the common market and ordering recovery, even if the competent authority is responsible for the illegality of the aid decision to such a degree that revocation appears to be a breach of good faith towards the recipient, where the latter could not have had a legitimate expectation that the aid was lawful because the procedure laid down in [Article 88(3) EC] had not been followed."
-16 -about to claim the same incentive, hence the government's potential lack of enthusiasm for notification. Another option is to file a formal complaint in Brussels, but as a potential beneficiary this is rather unlikely and maybe even inadmissible.
If our beneficiary cannot convince the government to notify, he may be tempted to go along and claim his tax incentive anyway, especially when his competitors are unaware of potential state aid issues (or have decided to accept the risk of paying back the incentive plus interest) and thus receive similar tax benefits that may put him out of business. For a businessman driven into a corner this is, to some extent, an understandable course of action especially when he really is in doubt and not sure whether the incentive actually constitutes state aid.
In this respect I would like to emphasise the importance of the often neglected option available to governments to notify tax incentives that they consider not to be state aid, just for reasons of legal certainty. 30 The downside to this process of exchanging information is that pending the notification and the subsequent investigation a stand-still will be in effect that prevents the Member States from implementing its proposed (and allegedly non-aid)
incentive. Those national governments that are aware of this option seem rather reluctant to use it because of this delay. Moreover, a notification of a 'non-aid' measure is likely to attract the special attention of the Commission as well as political attention, both domestically and abroad.
In my opinion a system should be in place that would allow a potential beneficiary access to the Commission to get a decision, such as opening up the 'complaint' procedure of Article 20(2) of the Procedural Regulation to beneficiaries asking for a 'no aid' decision. 31 The main drawback to this it is the potential massive amount of requests. Yet, we should keep in mind 
7.
Should we benchmark the EU's state aid regime?
In legal discussions on the EU's state aid system the need for such a system is often taken for granted, as is the process of ex ante control by the Commission. A state aid system is deemed necessary to protect the proper functioning of the internal market and intra-community competition and trade, yet the European Union seems to be the only group of countries that has such an elaborate and clearly defined system in place. The United States, for instance, seem to get along without such a stringent regime quite well. The main uncertain factor here seems to be the extent of the US Constitution's Commerce Clause restrictions in matters of tax incentives. resulting from the Cuno judgment -will be a nice treat for European academics should it ever be put into law. 40 It will allow the US states to keep competing among themselves through the use of economic development incentives like tax breaks, within certain constitutional limits;
whether there is a need for such incentives may still be determined by the states themselves.
Concluding remarks
In this discussion paper I have briefly raised a number of issues for further discussion that have yet to be clarified in future state aid decisions and judgements.
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The first conceptual issue is whether tax incentives providing benefits to groups are to be regarded selective as such, because individual, single enterprises are not in a position to claim such benefits. The second point at issue is the impact of the VAT definition of economic activity in the field of state aid; strict adherence to VAT jurisprudence will probably put most investment fund regimes within the scope of state aid procedure because such funds often qualify as undertakings. As for the third issue, regional autonomy versus regional selectivity, the recent Portugal case has given a welcome opening for claims of autonomy despite the (necessarily) strict conditions to establish such autonomy. The financial interdependence between autonomous regions and the national government will be of major importance in this respect and will give cause to a new series of ECJ judgements to clarify these financial conditions. Fourth, as for VAT it is yet unclear whether state aid may play its part in cases of asymmetrical implementation of VAT legislation where deduction of input tax is possible while no output tax is due because of flaws in national legislation implementing the Community's VAT Directive. As for the fifth issue -the lack of legal protection of the diligent businessman who does doubt his tax incentive and who wants to play by the book -it is up to the European Commission and the Community's Courts to take appropriate action. In this respect a potential loophole in the stand-still provision of Article 88(3) EC was pointed out that may arise when Member States decide to notify aid as being a 'non aid' measure not meeting the criteria of Article 87(1) EC.
Comparative research into state aid law should not be limited to reviewing its implementation in EU Member States and the impact state aid law has on Member States' tax policy. It is necessary to reflect on the concept of state aid control by looking at other unions/federations of states that also (try to) maintain a common market. The EU's rather well defined concept of state aid and its procedure of (pro-)active supranational supervision by the Commission are rather unique. In the next years the US developments in respect of the Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine and its application on tax incentives affecting interstate competition will probably provide an occasion for joint pan-European/US research despite of the differences in the political frameworks and the division of taxing powers in the US and the EU.
